Abstract. An insurer has to know the risks faced by a potential client to accurately determine an insurance premium offer. However, while the potential client might have a good understanding of its own security practices, it may also have an incentive not to disclose them honestly since the resulting information asymmetry could work in its favor. This information asymmetry engenders adverse selection, which can result in unfair premiums and reduced adoption of cyber-insurance. To overcome information asymmetry, insurers often require potential clients to selfreport their risks. Still, clients do not have any incentive to perform thorough self-audits or to provide comprehensive reports. As a result, insurers have to complement self-reporting with external security audits to verify the clients' reports. Since these audits can be very expensive, a key problem faced by insurers is to devise an auditing strategy that deters clients from dishonest reporting using a minimal number of audits. To solve this problem, we model the interactions between a potential client and an insurer as a two-player signaling game. One player represents the client, who knows its actual security-investment level, but may report any level to the insurer. The other player represents the insurer, who knows only the random distribution from which the security level was drawn, but may discover the actual level using an expensive audit. We study the players' equilibrium strategies and provide numerical illustrations.
Model
We model the interactions between an insurer and a potential client, whom we will call the organization, as a two-player single-shot game. For a list of symbols that are used in our model, see Table 1 . We assume that the organization has a type t ∈ S, where S is a finite set of types. Type t models the level of security investments and the combination of security measures that the organization implements. For simplicity, we let type t be equal to the estimated probability of the organization not suffering a cyber-incident. The organization applies for insurance coverage and the insurer determines the premium as follows:
-First, the organization's type t is drawn randomly from the set of types S according to a known distribution 5 . We let T denote the random variable taking the value of the organization's type, and we let P t denote the probability that the organization's type is t (i.e., P t = Pr[T = t]).
-Second, the organization chooses a type r ∈ S that it reports to the insurer.
The organization's choice may be randomized based on a mixed strategy. We let R denote the random variable taking the value of the reported type. -Based on the reported type r, the insurer decides whether to audit the organization or not. If the insurer chooses to audit the organization, then the true type t is revealed, but the insurer incurs a constant auditing cost C. -Finally, based on the type t or r (depending on whether the organization has been audited), the insurer chooses a premium p that is asked from the organization in exchange for insurance coverage. The organization rejects the coverage if doing so increases its utility; otherwise, it accepts the coverage and pays the premium.
Strategies
An organization's strategic choice is to select what type to report to the insurer. We let ρ t denote the mixed strategy of an organization with real type t, where ρ t r is the probability that the organization reports type r (i.e., ρ t r = Pr[R = r | T = t]). Note that we assume that the organization's strategic choice does not include coverage acceptance or rejection (i.e., we assume that coverage is rejected if and only if it is not worth purchasing). This is similar to assuming that the organization makes coverage decisions but restricting the solutions to subgame perfect equilibria (i.e., prohibiting non-credible threats of not purchasing insurance). The insurer's first strategic choice is to decide whether to audit the organization or not. Before auditing, the insurer does not know the organization's real type t, but it does know the exogenous parameter values of the model 6 , which include the distribution from which the type was drawn (i.e., it knows the probabilities P t ), as well as the organization's reporting strategies ρ. We let a denote the insurer's strategy, where a r is the probability that the insurer audits an organization with reported type r. The insurer's second strategic choice is to choose a premium p. First, we let p N denote the insurer's strategy given that it has not performed an audit, where p N r is the premium asked from an organization with reported type r. Second, we let p A denote the insurer's strategy given that it has performed an audit, where p A t is the premium asked from an organization with real type t.
Payoffs
Now, we define the players' payoffs in the various outcomes of our game. As it is standard in the cyber-insurance literature, we capture the risk aversion of clients using a concave utility function, initial wealth, and potential losses. First, the organization's payoff (i.e., utility), if it accepts coverage is
6 These may be learned from statistics that are available to the insurer.
where W is the organization's initial wealth, and U is its utility function, which we assume to be continuous, monotonically increasing, and concave. Second, the organization's payoff if it rejects coverage is U org,rej t
where L is its loss in case of a cyber-incident. The two terms correspond to the cases of suffering a cyber-incident and not suffering one, respectively. If the insurer audits the organization, its payoff (i.e., profit) is
where 1 {insurance accepted} is equal to 1 if the organization purchases insurance, and 0 otherwise. If the insurer does not audit, then its payoff is
Note that the insurer does not learn the true value of t if it does not audit the organization; however, its payoff still depends on t.
Given mixed-strategy profile (ρ, (a, p N , p A )), the expected utility of an organization with type t is
while the insurer's expected utility is
Solution Concept
We are interested in finding an equilibrium of our game, which can capture the long-term insurance market equilibrium. Since our model is essentially a signalling game, we use perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. After receiving the reported level r, the insurer's belief regarding the potential client's real type can be expressed using Bayes' rule as
-for each security level t ∈ S, the strategy ρ t * maximizes the expected utility of an organization with level t given the insurer's strategy (a * , p N * , p A * ):
-for each reported security level r ∈ S, the strategy (a * , p N * , p A * ) maximizes the expected utility of the insurer given its belief regarding the potential client's real type t:
Preliminary Analysis
Next, we provide some necessary conditions on the players' best responses.
Lemma 1. An organization of type t accepts insurance coverage for premium p if and only if p ≤p t , wherê
Proof. By definition, an organization with type t accepts coverage for premium p if and only if
Lemma 2. In an equilibrium, the premium p A t * that an insurer requests from an organization with type t after an audit is p
the insurer asks for some premium p A t * > p * t , which will always be rejected by the organization.
Proof. If the insurer has audited an organization and found its type to be t, then its payoff for premium p will be
When p ≤p t , the first derivative of the payoff U ins,aud (t, p) is
hence, the maximum on interval (−∞,p t ] is attained atp t , and the maximum payoff isp t − (1 − t) · L − C. When p >p t , the payoff is always −C since the organization rejects coverage. Hence,p t is an optimal premium p A t * if and only if
otherwise, premiums greater thanp t are optimal, which will be rejected.
Lemma 3.
In an equilibrium, the premium p N r * that an insurer requests without an audit from an organization with reported type r is either p N r * ∈ {p t | t ∈ S}, which may be accepted by some organizations, or p N r * > max {p t | t ∈ S}, which will be rejected by any organization.
Proof. If the insurer has not audited an organization that reported type r, then its payoff for premium p will be
The values {p t | t ∈ S} divide the set of possible premium values [0, ∞) into |S| + 1 contiguous intervals, the last one being (max {p t | t ∈ S} , ∞). The payoff is strictly increasing on each interval, except for the last one. On the last interval, (max {p t | t ∈ S} , ∞), the payoff is always zero. Therefore, the optimal premium p N r * is either one of the values {p t | t ∈ S} or any value p N r * > max {p t | t ∈ S}, which will be rejected by any organization.
Numerical Illustrations
In this section, we present numerical illustrations of our model. We let S = {0.5, 0.65, 0.8, 0.95}, W = 10, L = 5, the utility function U be the natural logarithm function, and the organization's type t be drawn according to P 0.5 = 0.125, P 0.65 = 0.375, P 0.8 = 0.375, and P 0.95 = 0.125; we used numerical search to find equilibria for various audit costs C. Figure 2 shows the organization's and the insurer's expected payoffs in equilibrium as functions of the audit cost C. The organization's expected payoff remains steady if it is secure and has little incentive to misreport. But in the case of an organization with security level 0.5, the payoff increases when the auditing cost reaches the value of 0.22. On the other hand, the insurer's expected payoff decreases with the auditing cost, but the rate of reduction is fairly small. Figure 3 shows the probabilities Pr[T = t] of reporting various types as functions of the audit cost C. We observe rampant misreporting since the organization's security level is either t = 0.5 or t = 0.65 with probability 0.5 = Figure 4 shows the equilibrium auditing probabilities a * as functions of the audit cost C. Interestingly, the results show that in an equilibrium, the insurer does not conduct audits for reported security levels equal to or less than 0.8. Figure 5 shows the equilibrium premiums without audit p N * as functions of the audit cost C. We notice that for the lowest security level assessed, 0.5, the premium is the highest one and remains steady for the entire range of audit costs. Such a security level means having a 50% chance of getting compromised and therefore the insurer must ask for a sizable premium. For security levels 0.8 and 0.95, when audit costs are higher than 0.2, the equilibrium premiums are identical and lower than for the other two security levels, 0.5 and 0.65. In future work, we will conduct further experiments to understand the behaviour of the insurer's strategy in terms of premiums in the equilibrium, considering both the audited and non-audited cases.
Related Work
We discuss two classes of related work: literature on cyber-insurance-more specifically on adverse selection, moral hazard, and information asymmetriesand literature on security audits.
Cyber-insurance and Information Asymmetry: Some of the main factors that hinder cyber-risk management via cyber-insurance are risk correlations, interdependence, and information asymmetries [8] . Among these, we focus on information asymmetries, which are taken into account by many articles in the field of security economics and cyber-insurance [4, 12, 17, 20] .
Shetty et al. [21, 22] prove a proposition providing a condition, which when satisfied, states that any insurance contract with security levels unobservable by the insurers strictly decreases the utility of the users, leading to a missing insurance market. Yet, with insurers present, and security levels contractible, in any equilibrium, full client coverage is offered.
Schwartz et al. [19] investigate the occurrence of a "lemon market" [2] when insurers cannot differentiate between different risk behaviors of clients. Lack of rich information about user choices and activities, leads to information asymmetry, which worsens the usual insurers' problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. They prove that no matter how small the fraction of malicious users is, an equilibrium does not exist, and therefore the cyber-insurance market is missing. In addition, they claim that due to adverse selection, cyber-insurers would not underwrite contracts conditioning user premiums on their security.
Bandyopadhyay et al. [5] build an economic model describing an optimal cyber-insurance contract and the optimal claim strategy for the insured firm. They show that insured firms optimally transfer more risk through insurance contracts under information symmetry than otherwise. They also present a circle of steps going from information symmetry for the cyber-insurance market to information asymmetry when the client first realizes the effect of IT risks, to end up back in information symmetry when the insurer finds out about the altered claiming and buying behavior as well as the underlying reasons.
Security Audits for Cyber-insurance Underwriting: In [3] , Baer and Parkinson suggest that both insurers and clients are sophisticated in dealing with security assessments regarding cyber-insurance coverage decisions. Cyberinsurers demand audits by independent consultants on a case-by-case basis, depending on the risks to be insured and the client requirements with regards to policy limits [10] . For example, the largest cyber-insurance underwriter, called AIG, asks prospective clients to complete an "Information Security Self Assessment" online. The results of such self-assessments determine whether the insurer will undertake a security audit on client's premises to bind coverage.
Böhme [7] argues that security audits can generate positive utility overcoming information asymmetries in a scenario focused on "solving coordination problems." According to this, the players themselves decide about their own security investment and whether or not to give away information about the resulting security level. Security audits are a tangible way to derive such security levels. The author states that it is difficult to measure the security level of products due to: (i) the difficulty of specifying all security requirements; and (ii) attacks neither occur deterministically nor is their occurrence observable in real time. The hardness of measurement implies significant effort to undertake a meaningful audit and requires special knowledge and experience. The difficulty of the audit increases disproportionately to the complexity of the system due to the non-linear growth of interdependencies among different assets.
Khalili et al. [13] suggest that recent advances in Internet measurement combined with machine learning techniques enable accurate quantitative assessments of security posture at a firm level. They claim that this can be used as a tool to perform an initial security audit, or pre-screening, of a prospective client to better enable premium discrimination and the design of customized policies.
Conclusions
Cyber-insurers face the challenge of devising a policy that is "reasonable" for the client to purchase but profitable for the insurer as well. To elicit risk levels for premium calculations, the insurer either asks the organization to conduct some self-assessment and report it, or it undertakes an audit to identify the real security level with certainty. Further, the possibility of being audited by the insurer may incentivize the organization to report truthfully. However, such an audit introduces costs for the insurer, which may be relatively high.
We introduced a new model to study optimal strategies for self-reporting security levels (for organizations) and undertaking expensive audits (for insurers). The insurers' strategy aims to ensure that the actual security levels of their clients have been elicited and therefore "fair" contracts (coverage, premium) are put in place. More concretely, we modeled the interactions between a potential client and an insurer as a two-player signaling game, where the organization plays the role of the sender, while the insurer plays the role of the receiver. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to attempt studying incentives for auditing potential clients before cyber-insurance premium calculations. The proposed model may form the basis of a framework that can further accelerate the adoption of cyber-insurance.
Our model and analyses do have certain limitations, which we intend to improve upon in future work. First, future work may allow the insurer to offer multiple levels of coverage (for different premiums) to an organization; i.e., when the insurer computes premiums, it also associates these premiums with certain degrees of loss recovery. Secondly, future work may allow the insurer to perform cyber-forensics when a claim is filed in order to reveal whether the organization was honest when reporting its security level. In this case, the insurer avoids auditing costs, but may still be able to deter clients from misreporting. We shall investigate the trade-offs between forensics and auditing costs. Furthermore, we will consider penalties for untruthful organizations. Punishment of such behavior may be realized in the form of increased premiums or reduction of some reputation metric that affects any future cyber-insurance contract of the organization. More ambitiously, our plan is to work with cyber-insurers to acquire realistic data as part of a recently funded research project.
